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Cullmann: Rudolf Bultmann's Concept of Myth and the New Testament

Rudolf Bultmann's Concept of
Myth and the New Testament
By OSCAR CULLMANN
EDITORIAL NOTB: Dr. Cullmann, who is professor of New Tesrament
hisrorical theology
the
at
universities of Basel and Paris, is inrernarionally
known as a thoroughly Biblical scholar. Among his widely read books are
Th, &,lioJI Ch,is1;11n
Timt1,
Christian
Con/ossion,,
Worship,
Christ 11ntl
1!.11,l7
;,,, tho New T,s111m,nl, and P,tor. In the course of his lecture tour
in our counrry the p t winter and early spring, Professor Cullm nn visited also
our seminary in St. Louis. Here he delivered two lectures, one of which it is
our privilege to publish. la the letter accompanying the maauKripr, Professor
Cullmann writes: "Herewith I am sending you the promised manuscript on
Bultmao.n. • • • I am happy to submit it for publication in your journal,
since I am concerned to remain in touch with Concordia. . . . I shall always
fondly treasure my short sray with you. I received an excellent impression of
your seminary, the (acuity, and the studeau."

I

s it necessary to add a new contribution to the dossier, already
too voluminous, of the debate revolving around the publication
of Rudolf Bultmann, former professor on the faculty of
Protestant theology at Marburg, titled The New Testa,ne-nl and
M11hology? This small pamphlet, which may be considered
a manifesto and has since been reproduced by the author in
a slightly different form, appeared for the first time in 1941
under the tide OOenbamng tmd Hei/,sgeschehe-n. The purpose of
the author is to make the New Testament language accessible to
the modern mind by eliminating what he calls the "myth" and
what I call "redemptive history" (Heilsgeschichte).
I myself took issue with Professor Bulanann in 1944.1 Since
the conclusion of the war the discussion aroused by this influential
scholar dominates the Protestant theology of Germany to the point
of having relegated more or less to the background all other
problems. Is this the reason why studies concerning the origins
of Christianity are experiencing a certain stagnation in postwar
Germany? This is so much more regrettable because New Testa•
ment studies owe much to German scholars and even to works
published by Rudolf Bultmann himself. I do not wish to imply
that since the war there have appeared in Germany no solid works
whatever on certain particular points in the New Testament area.
13
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But compared with the richness and importance of earlier German
productions in the exegetical and historical field, the horizon of the
investigation appears, in this area, to have become considerably
limited. The question naturally arises whether the discussion regarding the problem of method, that is, the method of "demythologizing," has not dissipated some of the efforts of German scholars
that might have been employed more usefully.
The professor at Marburg himself is less responsible for this
development than the excessive enthusiasm and fanatical polemic
displayed by some of his disciples and opponents. Does not German
theology too often have the tendency to be fashionable, to be
absorbed entirely by one single problem, to be "in style," but to
become passe as soon as another novelty makes its appearance?
The momentary enthusiasm, in such instances, is generally as
little justified as the complete oblivion which often succeeds it at
the end of twenty years. The same symptoms reproduce themselves
in each instance: The name of an ouutanding theologian leaps into
prominence, and a slogan is coined which highlights or, for that
matter, caricatures his ideas.2 The actual slogan launched by Bultmann, which designates the problem of his interest, was adopted
by his disciples and opponents, though in this instance it strikes
one as a term particularly barbaric, namely, "demythologizing."
The German word Entm,thologisienmg, though a bit Jess difficult
to pronounce, is scarcely more beautiful than its English translation.
This slogan imposed itself more readily because in the theological
thought of Bultmann it relates itself closely to a current vogue in
philosophy known as existentialism. But it also relates itself to
a subject which has in recenr years fascinated philosophers, ethnologists, psychologists, and religious historians, and which is designated
as "myth." 3
In order to account for the Bow of ink that Bultmann's publication released since the war, it will suffice to consider the three
volumes in which Hans-Werner Bartsch assembled, under the title
K.,,gm• tmtl Mythos, the articles by different authors who entered
in on the problem raised by Bultmann, as well as the answers
which Bultmann himself supplied to some of these articles. Since
the appearance in 1952 and 1953 of the second and third volumes
of Bartsch's collective work the literature on the subject bas been
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enriched considerably by further contributions, of which we shall
cite only the most important: the pamphlet published by the
theologian Karl Barth" and the article by the philosopher Karl
Jaspers.0 There is therefore enough material available for a fourth
volume in the Bartseh series, unless there were t0 arise a new
problem of such general concern as to overshadow current interest
in Bultmann's problem.
There are in "Bultmann's position, to begin with, certain fixed
principles of interpretation. Of these principles the elements
unacceptable for modern thought in their traditional form Bultmann calls them "mythological" - are destined, in reality, to
communicate to us a new manner of understanding our tme
existence and to liberate us from our false comprehension of it.
According to the expression dear to existentialist philosophy, whose
influence Bultmann has strongly experienced, especially in the
form that Heidegger gave it,0 the sacred New Testament text
stripped of its mythological form will give to the reader a new
self-understanding (Selbst1111,stiintlnis) 1 a new comprehension of
himself.
And what does Bultmann mean by "myth"? What is that
element of which, according to him, it is necessary to rid the
affirmations of the New Testament in order to give them the only
interpretation acceptable today, that is to say, an existentialist
interpretation in the sense indicated? Bultmann defines "myth" as
the "representation according t0 which that which is transcendent,
divine, appears as immanent, human; the invisible as visible."
Understood thus, there are not "myths" in the New Testament.
There is only one unique "myth," or rather, everything in the New
Testament is only "mythical" expression; more precisely still:
"mythical" expression of our "authentic existence." And what is
this "authentic existence"? Let us look at Bultmann's answer. The
man without faith trusts in this world, which gives him a false
security; and as soon as he becomes aware that his values escape
him, he is overwhelmed with cares which transform themselves
inro "agony." It is of that situation that the message of the New
Testament liberates us by making us pass to the "authentic
existence" by way of the realities not under our control-which
are the only true .realities - and to abandon confidence in the
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controllable realities which are at our disposal. Thus the existence
of the interpreter himself is engaged in the exegetical debate. In
order to describe the "authentic existence," the New Testament uses,
according tO Bultmann, the antiquated form of the "myth," which
one is no longer able to accept, so he claims, any more than one is
able tO accept a naive construa of the world "when one uses at the
same time electticity and the radio."
Therefore all that which the .first Christians believed regarding
a people chosen by God from eternity and regarding a divine Being
that became incarnate on earth among people among whom He
accomplished His divine mission; regarding His redemptive, substitutionary death, His resurrection, His activity in the communion
of saints through the Sacraments, and His .final return: all that is
"myth."' Again, all this "redemptive history" (Heilsgeschichte ),
which the New Testament writers saw developing so to speak in
the frame of ordinary, profane history, is, in reality, only "myth.''
Jesus' appearance in history and His human existence is subordinated to the "myth" and does not belong to the profound
essence of the thought of the New Testament.
To suip this thought of the "myth" is not, then, according t0
Bultmann, tO discern between the historical elements and the
"mythical" ones, as the "Lives of Jesus" of the nineteenth century
had attempted, but it is to consider in a consistent manner the
"redemptive history" in its totality as a "myth"; and it is to search
there, conforming to the nature of all myth, and explication of our
"authentic existence" and to express it with the aid of modern
categories. Expressed in another way: Bultmann rejects, on the
one hand, the rotality of "redemptive history" in so far as it
pretends tO be history, and he accepts, on the other hand, the
totality of that history on condition that one regards it a "myth"
susceptible to interpretation, in virtue of its profound intention,
according to the categories of existentialism. With regard tO the
point roward which we are direaing ourselves, that is tO say, tO the
study of early Christianity, this means that for Bultmann the
hiJ1oric11l element charaaerizing the teaching of the first Christians
is not essential, but a means of "mythical" expression for an
a-historical, a-temporal uuth, of which it forms the real substance.
1bis devaluation of the historiclll element in the message of early
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Christianity, does it not remind us singularly of the Gnosticism of
antiquity, of that conception of Christianity which also pretended
t0 scorn hist0ry to the point of denying the truly historical character of Jesus? We are tempted to think of docetism, which
attributes to Jesus only the appearance of a body.
On the other hand, Bultmann's point of view does not appear,
at first glance, much different from the conclusion of modern
scholars, such as Drews and Couchoud, who classify as "mythologists" and who deny the historical existence of Jesus in order to
make an integrated myth of it.
However, Bultmann has too much sense of history to fall into the
above errors. He seems to have recognized the dangers of this
association. Furthermore, he insists emphatically at least on one
historical fact: the death of Christ. It is the only historical event
which he recognizes to have fundamental value for the salvation
of man. Apart from d1e death of Jesus, we know, so Bultmann
asserts, nothing about the historical Jesus. And where lies the
value of Christ's death? Bultmann replies: The cross makes us pass
from the false security of a life according to the principles of the
visible world and the world which we can control to the faith
which makes us live according to the principles governing what
lies beyond our control. Thus the necessity of the Christian
revelation at the side of philosophy seems to be safeguarded. But
one is compelled to ask: Does not profane existentialist philosophy
achieve, according to Bultmann, exactly the same result in its
analysis of the "authentic existence" without the Bible and without
Christ? An affirmative answer to this question would make
perfectly superfluous the Christian revelation. Professor Bultmann
is aware of this dangerous inference and is obliged to make the
following distinction: Whereas philosophy hopes to arrive at the
comprehension of the "authentic existence" by way of the intellect,
the Christian knows that he needs the divine act of the death of
Christ as an image, which, always anew, confronts him with the
decision of faith. It is the call addressed to us by the cross of Christ,
what Bultmann calls the kerygm11 {the message) of the New
Testament. There is, then, one historical element which remains
in the necessary process of "demythologizing," that which sets in
motion, so to speak, the entire process of existentialist interpretation.
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We shall not ask here, as others have done, the question whether
Bultmann is consistent with himself when he allows the last
historical element to remain as an element of salvation. Some of
Bultmann's disciples reproach their master for not being consistent
in this respect. They eliminate this last historical event as an
element of salvation. But did Bultmann himself interpret correctly
the profound intention of the faith of the .6.m Christians in
attributing to the cross of Christ the function that we have just
noted? In order to reply to this question it seems appropriate to
take note of the element because of which the German scholar
seems to be nearest to the language of the New Testament itselfthe cross of Christ, since this is the only historical factor which he
recognizes to be of value for salvation.
But is it really the cross of which the Apostle Paul speaks?
Is it really the unique aa accomplished once for all time ( icpcbta;)
of which the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks? No,
for, according to Bultmann, it is not Christ's death on the cross,
the last historical event, which saves us, but uniquely the encounter
between the historical event and man. I insist on the word
"uniquely." Of course, the writings of the New Testament also
teach that it is faith which saves, but for them it is the faith that
the event of the death of Christ as such has saved us already.
By faith we merely appropriate to ourselves the fruit of that which
h3' already been achieved independently of us. For Bultmann the
event itself, apart from the appeal it addresses to us, signifies
nothing for our salvation and is only a martyrdom like other
martyrdoms. Therefore any other martyrdom could, on principle,
have exactly the same effect, when there is an encounter between it
and ourselves.
Salvation does nor. then, in Bultmann's terms, reside in the unique
aa, in Christ's death on the cross, but is an event repeated ever
anew in each individual, whenever the message of the death of
Christ addresses itself to him. At the unique historical moment
when Christ expired on the cross, nothing happened ontologically
for the salvation of humanity. When, therefore, the .first Christians
speak of a redemptive death for our sins, of a reconciliation with
God, and thus of an effect produced outside ourselves, we again
meet the "myth." The "demythologized" faith in the death of
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Christ is nor, then, a faith in the unique event, but only in the
invitation it addresses to us to conceive our existence in a new way.
Faith is not the conviaion that the event of Golgotha has effectively
placed us in a new situation, but that it invices us to reconsider
our existence.
Thus even the single historical event that Bultmann allows to
remain as an element of salvation is, in reality, stripped of its
character as a unique event.
I decline to judge the personal theological position of Bultmann
which he defends with sincere conviction that does not lack
grandeur and that I respect. But is it not an illusion on the part
of the German theologian to believe that the ..demythologized"
faith in the cross of Jesus really was the faith of the first Christians?
In reality we are not dealing with a simple transposition of the
Christian message into our modern language, but with a faith
radically different in its essence. The obje&I of faith is no longer
the same. That which throughout the New Testament characterizes
the faith in the divine aa accomplished through Christ is the
complete surrender to an event in the past which certainly
happened for us, but for us because entirely otmid, us. The believer
of the New Testament believes that something happened between
God and Christ through the reconciliation effected by the death of
Christ: the new era was inaugurated. Mose certainly we must
belie11,, but the objea of our faith is the unique event itself which
has happened. The "once for all time" does not concern the
understanding of our existence. Certainly, the first Christians arrived
at a new understanding of their existence, but only through a faith
which precisely does not relate itself to that understanding, but to
the ontological scope of the aa on Calvary. The man of the New
Testament does not believe in a martyr whose death has a pedagogical meaning for all humanity, but in the "Servant of God"
who by a voluntary ace, through His death on the cross, took away
the sin of the world.
Some people no doubt agree with Bultmann that it .is no longer
possible for the man of today to adhere to that faith. But they
should know that by replacing that faith with the faith in the
pedagogical meaning of the cross they are no longer interpreting the
faith of the New Testament, because they have jettisoned its object
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and, in so doing, the fundamental character of the New Testament
faith. Any other martyrdom could have the same effect.
Bultmann believes to have stripped the primitive Christian message of the "myth," a simple form of expression, whereas in reality
he has stripped it of its historical basis, of the "once for all time,"
which characterizes the central redemptive event. In his definition
of the "myth" - "the transcendent represented by the immanent" he encircles in the immanent also the historical factor, but without
noticing that for primitive Christianity the historical factor is not
a simple representation of a transcendent theme, but the point of
deparrure and the permanent substance of faith.
The historical and temporal element distinguishes Judaism and
Christianity from all other religions, and consequently one may not
eliminate it without attacking the very substance of either. In effect,
in Christianity this historical element is still more important than
in Judaism, because Christians take their point of departure in
"the fullness of the time" ( Gal. 4: 4), in the fact that time has
already in the death of Jesus Christ reached its central point, which
divides it, in a decisive way, into two parts, the old era and the
new era.
That an historical event which inserts itself in profane history
may thus have a decisive meaning for the salvation of the world,
that is what the Apostle Paul calls the "foolishness of the cross."
To strip the faith of the New Testament of the faith in the unique
event, is it not to strip it of its "foolishness" and thus of its very
bean? Does it not, then, become an "empty" cross, as the Apostle
Paul suggests. in 1 Cor.1:17? For it is essential to note that this
"foolishness" is not, as Bultmann thinks, a faith in that which
is not within man's control and at his disposal. Thal faith many
Greeks would have been able to accept and to express with the aid
of real myths. But that the redemptive act is an hislorical datum,
that was "foolishness" for Greek thought and is that for modern
thought. For this reason we are in no other siruation today than
were the Greek philosophers, in spite of "electricity and the radio."
For that which the Apostle calls "foolishness" has nothing to do
with the naive mental construa of the world which the ancients
had and which we, too, no longer accept. The cross, the center of
redemptive history for the world, was "foolishness" already for the
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Greeks of the first century, who were not yet acquainted with
"elccuicity and radio." It was and it still is the center, the very
heart of the Christian faith, and we dare not eliminate it. To
eliminate this core of the faith of the .first Christians, is not to
render the New Testament accessible to the modern mind, but
it is to replace the New Testament faith with another faith.
That is why already the Gnoscics of antiquity and also many
theologians of the ancient church tried to do, m11ta1is m11tm11lis,
what Bultmann proposes to us. Their attempt to eliminate the
"foolishness" of an everlasting salvation accomplished in an historical fact challenges those who study the Hellenization of Christian thought. But their exegesis has scarcely any value, for they
have merely succeeded to have their Greek ideas agree with the
New Testament through the aid of the allegorical method.
The mystery religions and all syncretistic religions take their
point of departure in an a-temporal myth which repeats itself;
primitive Christianity took its point of departure in history and
rests resolutely in the frame of time, even though it interprets the
meaning of history. In eliminating this distinctive aspect which
distinguishes Christianity from the religions of the surrounding
world, and in reducing it to an a-temporal truth, Bultmann has in
reality demoted the Christian faith to the syncretism to which,
in reality, it showed itself a rebel. And may we not risk the
paradoxical affirmation that, by eliminating the temporal aspect of
the primitive Christian message, Bultmann has placed himself, in
truth, in the way of the "myth"?
I willingly concede that the history of salvation does not coincide
with profane history. It is an interpreted history. The historical
facts have been interpreted prophetically as hoZ, history. Consequently we must so interpret it. We shall therefore not reproach
Bultmann for having searched for the principles and motives
underlying the historical affirmations of the New Testament, but
we must insist on the fact that the motives of "redemptive history"
are not the same as the motives of the "myth" and that the temporal
character is inherent in the motives. We must make accessible to
the modern mind the prophetical interpretation of history as hoZ,
history. But in doing this we may not replace history with
existentialism.
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Certainly, the .first Christians had a new manner of understanding
their existence, to use the language of Bulunann. But they bad it
not because they set out consciously or unconsciously from a philosophical consideration of their existence, but because certain evcnm
of which they had been witnesses bad given them the conviction
of having been placed in the new era, in the new alwv, and of
having thus been integrated in the history of Christ. The comprehension of their existence was not their point of departure
but the consequence of some events. The point of departure was
certain events whose fundamental importance Bulunann, so it
appears to me, minimizes. It does not concern only the cross
but the whole life of Christ. It includes the events which the
New Testament interprets as proofs of the resurrection of Jesus,
and certain aas which it attributes to a direct aaion of the Holy
Spirit. Bultmann almost never speaks of the resurrection and still
less of the manifestation of the Holy Spirit in the first Christian
community. However, it was precisely these events in which the
first Christians saw manifest a history of the Christ designated by
the Apostle Paul as otxovoµ(a. This begins with the creation of
the world, of which the Christ was the Mediator; it continues after
the Fall, with the election of the people of Israel; it reaches ia
climax in the death and resurrection of the Christ; it evidences
itself in the communion of saints, the body of Christ, the new
Israel; it will fulfill itself in the return of Christ.
The "focus" of this "redemptive history" consisted for the first
Christians in the act of being incorporated effectively in its temporal fulfillment as the new Israel, the communion of saints. There
are in the "redemptive history" that we have outlin.ed elemena
which are not controllable by profane history alongside the elements
controlled by history. I call these elemena prophetical. That which
unites the two categories of elements is that they all are presented
to us in a temporal perspective in the frame of Heil.sgesehiehle.
Certainly, the first Christians were not able to distinguish between
these two categories of events, but we must do it when we explain
the New Testament to the modern mind. But that which is
important to me here is not this factor, but rather the consideration
that profane history was not absorbed by the nonhistorical, prophetical elements, bur, vice versa, that the prophetical elements are
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made tO harmonize with the historical events. I have shown in
detail in my book Chrisl and, Tim• how the origins of "redemptive
history" are constituted by historically nonconuollable events, by
prophetical elements, also the end of "redemptive history," the
apocalyptic events, and how even the description of the central
part, which is more particularly historical, also utilized in some
places themes which are not historically controllable. But all these
elements to which, apart from the Christian "redemptive history,"
we can apply the general characteristics of the myth are subordinated in the new perspective tO the history of Christ.
Expressed in another way: by incorporating these elements of
profane history into the "redemptive history," the first Christians
in reality "demythologized" them, but not in order to set off
a nontemporal truth, but in order to put them in agreement with
the events of the history of Christ. We might say they "historized"
them in the sense of "redemptive history" (Heilsgeschichte) so that
they cease to be myths in the New Testament. That is the reason
why it is not possible to eliminate them by an existentialist interpretation; we must, on the contrary, show in which way they are
destined to make evident the movement of holy history in relation
tO the conuollable historical events. To make this distinction is our
wk as we make the New Testament accessible to the modern mind.
In order to answer the question with which we began, I shall
say that in attributing the notion of the "myth," as Bultmann has
defined it, to the teaching of primitive Christianity, Bultmann does
not appear to have furnished for the exegesis of the writings of the
first Christians a method of interpretation adequate to penetrate
into the profound sense of their thought. Wishing to strip the
New Testament of the "myth," he has stripped it rather of the
"redemptive history," of the central events which form the substance
itself of the Christian faith. These events may be inacceptable to
the modern mind, but this does not mean that they were not
constitutive and essential to that of the Christians of the first
century. The "myth" may be an object of study for psychoanalysis
and philosophy, but it does not authorize us to search also the
intention of the thought of the New Testament in this direction.
New Testament exegesis is difficult enough and must not stoop to
arbitrariness.
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In interpreting the first Christian documents by way of the
philosophical approach of the individual existence, we ascribe to
their authors a preoccupation which, in any case, is not primiuy
for them, and we make mythical and timeless what they regarded
to be real and temporal.
I conclude: The historical character of salvation, which Bulanlinn
regards as inacceptable to the modern mind ( the mind of the
century of "electricity and radio"), is not a secondary element,
but it is the essence of the thought of the New Testament. It
cannot be eliminated and replaced by an existential philosophy.
We must make the New Testament language accessible to the
modern mind, but it must still be the New Testament. We must
maintain the axciv&aAov of the historical event, the "foolishness
of the cross."
NOTES
1. To the fim German edition of Chris11111111,l di• Z•h (uanslated into English
under the tide Christ ,m,l Ti,,,.) Rudolf Bultmann published an answer in
Tht10l01i1eh• Lil•NlllrHil.,,I, 1948, pp. 659 f., under the tide "HeilsZu Oscar Cullmann, ChrhlNI ""' dit1 Z•il.H
geschichte und
2. I shall cite at random only some examples of this phenomenon of "collective
psychology" in the scientific rheological world, without offering a negative
judgment on the vilue of the works which are at the basis of these discussions:
Albert Schweirzer (slogan: "consistent eschatology")
Rudolf Oao (slogan: "the Numinous")
Karl Barth (slogan: "dialectic rheology")
Marrin Dibelius (slogan: "formgeschichdiche Methode")
3. I mention only some of these works: G. van der I.eeuw, Phi nomt1r1olo1N
d•rR•li1ion,
1933; C. G. Jung, 01,•r di• A.rr:b.1,11t1n tlt1s kol/t1/,1;_,
, #lrimi1i11t1 1936;
Ur,l,ftll111zt••· trans. 1934; L Uvy-Bruhl, L, ,,,,,holo1i•
C. G. Jung-IC. Kerenyi-, Eir,/iihr.,,1 in d•s W•s•• tl•r M,1hologit1, 1941;
P. Medicus, D•s M11holo1ur:b. in d•r Rt1li1ior1, 1944; M. Eliade, L,
d• l'ltfffl•l r•to11r, 1953; G. G111tlo,/, M11h• •t tnltqh,1iq11t1, 1953.
4. Karl Barth, R11tlol/ B11l1mn-.
Vn111eh,
tH1rst•h•••
Bin
iJJIJ u,
1952.
5. Karl Jupers, ''Wahrheit und Unheil der Bulrmannschen Entmythologisierung,'' Mnn,, 1953, pp. lOOUf.
6. Snn,nulZn,.

,,,,,,b.
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